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Petroleum Tanker Shipping on German Inland Waterways, 
1887-1994
Ingo Heidbrink
Tanker shipping today is one of the major branches of German inland navigation. Indeed, 
the transport of petroleum and its derivatives together comprise nearly twenty percent of 
total inland shipping; more than 42,000,000 tons of liquid petroleum products were shipped 
in 1996 by a fleet with a total cargo capacity of more than 500,000 tons.' Tanker shipping 
is by far the largest kind of specialist transportation on German inland waterways. But 
because of its very special technical requirements, a high degree of dependence on a small 
group of shippers, and a number of risks peculiar to this trade, there are enough structural 
differences to make it useful to take a closer look at this sector of inland navigation from an 
historical perspective.
Tanker Shipping on the Rhine and the Danube before 1914
After the first ocean-going tankers arrived in European harbours in the 1880s, it no longer 
made sense to continue the inland transport of petroleum in barrels. Instead, it became a bulk 
good. It is in this context that in 1887 Josef Conrad Fendel, a young shipowner from the mid-
Rhine district, decided to invest in the first German tanker for inland navigation. His ship 
was not a newbuild but rather a converted river barge that he had owned for some time. The 
conversion of a ship from general cargo to liquid bulk was accomplished by putting tanks 
into the former cargo bays. The economic risk of converting Carolina was not too high for 
because Fendel could draw on experience with similar ocean-going tankers and could count 
on a contract with the petroleum merchant Poth that guaranteed a minimum cargo of 50,000 
barrels per year between Rotterdam, Antwerp or Amsterdam and Mannheim. A bill of lading 
shows that Carolina must have had a minimum cargo capacity of 4800 barrels, which means 
that eleven voyages per year were needed to fulfil the contract.'
Because of rapidly rising petroleum consumption in Germany and Poth's petroleum 
trade in Mannheim, Fendel ordered four new tankers in 1890/1891.3 These ships could be 
called the first real tankers on German inland waterways because they were specifically built 
to transport liquid bulk goods. They no longer had separate tanks in the cargo bays; instead, 
the bays themselves were constructed as tanks. The hull of the ship was at the same time the 
hull of the tank. This main principle of tanker construction predominated on inland tankers 
for nearly 100 years.
The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord, XI, No. 2 (April 2001), 57-67.
57
58 The Northern Mariner
Although there were tankers on nearly every waterway, the Rhine and Danube 
became the main rivers for such traffic. The Rhine connected the main European petroleum 
importing ports for North America petroleum with the most important industrial regions in 
western and southwestern Germany. In consequence, tanker shipping was dominated by the 
international petroleum companies, which used the Rhine as the main transportation route 
for their European business. Special tankers were developed to transport gasoline and 
heating oil. Ships with ventilation systems for products with a high volatility were built 
before 1914, as well as vessels with steam-heated tanks for products with a high congealing 
temperature.4
Tanker shipping on the Rhine enjoyed particularly rapid growth rate between 1887 
and 1914. It constituted, however, only a small part of total transportation on that waterway; 
indeed, only two percent of total cargo on the river consisted of petroleum or its derivatives. 
For this reason there were only a few shipping companies involved in the business. They 
firms operated on long-term contracts with the petroleum industry. For example, the Dutch 
shipping company Van Ommeren was one of the main tanker shipping companies on 
German inland waterways.' Some of the tankers were even owned by the petroleum 
companies themselves, like the tanker fleet of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum-
Gesellschaft, the German branch of Standard Oil.
The situation on the Danube, on the other hand, was vastly different. There were 
neither petroleum import harbours near the river's mouth nor industrial centres along the 
German part of the river. Nevertheless, the river became one of the most important shipping 
routes for oil. While the German market was traditionally dominated by North American 
petroleum, there were other oil-producing countries that were interested in Germany. One 
of these nations was Romania. Since Romanian petroleum was not as easily refined as its 
North American counterpart, it had to be very inexpensive to gain a market share.'
The best route for inexpensive transport from Romania to Germany was the Danube. 
In 1898 the first train of barges reached the German Danube port of Regensburg after taking 
forty-two days to make the 2100-kilometre voyage with its difficult stretches, like the Iron 
Gate. Steaua Romana, a Romanian petroleum company, operated the barges and erected oil 
tanks in Regensburg. Although German petroleum imports from Romania rose from 2570 
tons in 1898 to 23,310 tons in 1906, Steaua Romana got into economic trouble when an 
expansion of company-owned infrastructure coincided with a fall of oil prices. In 
consequence, Deutsche Bank took over the majority of the company's shares in 1903. Now 
there were specific German economic interests in the development of the Romanian 
petroleum industry. Deutsche Bank wanted to break the near-monopoly of the American oil 
giants in Germany, especially the influence of Standard Oil. As long as Romanian-owned 
tankers operated on the Danube, Deutsche Bank was dependent on the Romanian 
government. Because of this dependence the bank, along some other bank groups and the 
Bavarian government, decided to establish its own shipping company, Bayerischer Lloyd, 
in 1913 with five tankers.' Through this investment Deutsche Bank hoped to achieve better 
profits for its Romanian oil activities, while the Bavarian government wanted to increase the 
foreign trade of a state without a seaport.
Unlike on the Rhine, only crude oil was transported, but the distances were much 
greater: as much as 2000 kilometres or even more. Although the first Danube tankers had 
been constructed similarly to those on the Rhine, a rapid technical development soon began. 
In 1913 Bayerischer Lloyd ordered two self-propelled diesel-driven tankers at the Ruthof
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shipyard in Regensburg; these were the first self-propelled tankers in the European inland 
navigation and two of the earliest motorships. König Ludwig III and BL II had cargo 
capacities of 628 tons and each was fitted with two diesel engines of 320 hp.8 But the attempt 
to break the monopoly ofNorth American oil companies still failed. Although the 42,000-ton 
Bayerischer Lloyd fleet was in operation, petroleum transport on the Danube nearly 
stagnated (see table 1). There were few additional loads transported by Bayerischer Lloyd, 
while Romanian tankers abandoned the carriage of petroleum to Germany. The importance 
of tanker shipping on the Danube was not the total cargo carried but the technical innovation. 
While on the Rhine tankers had hardly changed since the days of the Fendel ships in the late 
1880s and the 1890s, by the outbreak of the Great War Danubian tankers were diesel-driven 
and built according to the same principles as nearly all tankers for the next sixty or seventy 
years.
T a b l e  1
Petroleum-Transport on the Danube
(Iron Gate/upriver)
1912 
Petroleum and Petroleum Products 21.200 t
1913 1914
26.900 t 23.500 t
Sources: Franz Heiderich, Die Donau als Verkehrsstrasse (Wien, 1916), 41; and Julius Seress (ed.), Donau-
Handbuch 1917 (Wien, 1917), 200.
Tanker Shipping on a Forgotten Waterway: The Case of the Aller
Beside the great inland waterways like the Rhine and the Danube, there was one small and 
almost forgotten waterway that was important for tanker shipping. This was the Aller, a 
small tributary of the Weser. The oldest German petroleum deposits were located at Wietze, 
near the upper reaches of the Aller. Although production had been going on since the late 
1850s, there was no modern infrastructure; indeed, horse-drawn carts were the only means 
of transport.9 While the Aller was traditionally used for inland navigation, only small barges 
of less than 100 tons were able to operate. Clearly, this could not be the basis for tanker 
shipping.
After an oil boom in 1899/1900 the transport situation became disastrous. Rapidly-
rising petroleum output could no longer be accommodated on local roads, and a combination 
of railways and inland navigation seemed the only solution. But it took until 1908 for the 
government to decide to modernise the Aller through dredging and canalisation. Tankers of 
up to 300 tons could now be used on the Aller, after the completion of the hydraulic 
engineering system, which consisted of four locks and a minimum depth of the fairway of 
1.5 metres.10
Still, petroleum was not shipped on the Aller for a long time. In 1914, the German 
navy contracted the tankers of the Celler-Schleppschiffahrts-Gesellschaft, and private 
shipping did not resume after the peace. Yet this brief history is important for two reasons. 
It marked the first time that the petroleum industry used its political clout to lobby for a 
major engineering project to modernise an entire waterway. Moreover, despite its modest 
size the volumes transported on the Aller were impressive: the 21,240 tons of oil on the river 
in 1909 were nearly as large as on the Danube."
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1918-1933
After WW I German industry was wracked by inflation and the postwar world economic 
crisis. The petroleum industry was not as affected by inflation as most other branches of 
industry. Most German oil companies were part of international; since shareholders' equity 
was in US dollars or other international currencies, to some degree they gained from 
inflation. When inflation ended after 1923 Germany enjoyed a period of relative economic 
stability. The oil industry reached growth rates higher than any other industrial sector (see 
table 2). Moreover, tanker owners reaped nearly as much profit as the refineries. On the 
Rhine, in particular, the volume of cargoes increased exponentially (see table 3).
T a b l e  2
Annual Rates of Growth, Selected Industrial Sectors, Germany, 1913-1938
Sector 1913-1938 1913-1925 1925-1929 1929-1938
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Steel Production 1 -3 7.3 -29.4
Steel Processing 4.2 2.3 6.7 -20.9
Coal -0.1 -2.9 5.3 -13.8
Chemicals 5 2.4 8.8 -9.4
Petroleum 10.5 1.9 17 11.6
Source: Harold James, Deutschland in der Weltwirtschaftskrise 1924-1936 (Darmstadt, 1988), 121.
T a b l e  3
P e t r o l e u m - T r a n s p o r t  o n  t h e  R h i n e ,  1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 3
(Emmerich-Lobith/upriver)
1919 1920 1921 1922 1924 1926 1928 1929 1931 1933
Petroleum
and
petroleum-
products
54.629 t 129.857 t 131.898 t 260.193 t 288.373 t 541.118 t 842-018 t 988.426 945.775 t 1.084.571 t
Source: Jahresbericht der Zentral-Kommission für die Rheinschiffahrt 1919-1933 (Strassburg, 1920-1934).
The technical side of tanker shipping, however, did not develop as fast as the 
economic. The main construction principles did not change, although there were many 
improvements in detail, such as the addition of separate vent pipes to the pipe system and 
the installation of steam pumps. Instead, the main technical change between 1918 and 1933 
was in the size of tankers on the Rhine and the increasing number of motor tankers on the 
Danube. In the 1920s, some ships on the Rhine reached 3000 tons, such as TS Bavaria (3038 
tons, built 1926) and TS Germania (3292 tons, built 1929). While tankers on the Rhine were 
still tow-barges, some of the newly-built tankers on the Danube were motorships, like König 
Ludwig III. In 1928 ten motor tankers operated on the Danube, which means that five percent 
of total tanker tonnage on this waterway was self-propelled. In comparison, only one percent 
of the dry cargo vessels were self-propelled at the same time.12
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The Treaty of Versailles declared the Danube to be an international waterway. In 
addition, some German interests in the Romanian petroleum industry passed to a Romanian-
Anglo-French holding,13 and part of the German Danube-fleet was lost through reparations. 
This situation allowed foreign shipping companies to participate in Danube tanker shipping. 
Nevertheless the fleet of the Bayerischer Lloyd remained the largest tanker company on the 
Danube (see table 4).
T a b l e  4
International Tanker Shipping on the Danube, 1927/1928
Tanker Tow-Barges Motor Tankers Cargo Capacity
Bayerischer Lloyd (D) 27 3 22.128 t
Süddeutsche Donau 5 0 3.925 t
Dampfschiff Ges. (A)
Donau 28 0 19.563 t
Dampfschiffahrtsges. (A)
COMOS (NL) 10 6 12.910 t
Ungar. Fluss- und Seeschiffahrt 15 0 11.456 t
AG (HU)
FluBschiffahrt des Kgr. Der 29 0 23.567 t
Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen
(YU)
Navigatunea Fluviala Romana 12 0 5.102 t
(RU)
Societata de Navigatunea pe 15 0 14
Dunare (RU)
Astra Romana / Shell 12 1 8.920 t
(RU/GB)
Societe de Navigation 10 0 7.372 t
Danubienne
Sources: K. Ebner, "Mineralöltransporte mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Transporte zu Wasser." 
Petroleum. Zeitschrift für die gesamten Interessen der Petroleum-Industrie und des Petroleum-
Handels, XXIV (1928), 476.
UHU: The First European Push Boat
Despite international competitors, Bayerischer Lloyd's tanker operations on the Danube 
increased in the 1920s. The company's main business was still shipping crude oil between 
Romania and the ports Regensburg and Deggendorf. Its fleet consisted of a few motor 
tankers and tanker tow-barges. Other companies owned the tugboats. Because of the 
increasing demand for oil shipping, Bayerischer Lloyd sought better capacity utilisation for 
its tow-barges. Motorisation of the barges or building its own tugs were not feasible 
solutions because an arrangement between all the Danube shipping companies prohibited 
such actions. To try to find an alternative, Bayerischer Lloyd began to look at push boats of 
the type used on American waterways. Tryggve Sommerslad, chief engineer of the shipyard 
Gutehoffnungshütte Oberhausen AG was asked in 1928 for advice on technical and 
economic aspects of push boat operations on the Danube. His report envisaged an optimistic 
future for this kind of vessel in the tanker business.14
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The final decision, however, belonged to the managers of Deutsche Bank, still the 
main shareholder in Bayerischer Lloyd. Emil Georg von Stauss, the chairman of Deutsche 
Bank, decided personally that the bank would finance it because he expected it to have a 
positive influence on its petroleum interests. In 1929 a steam tug was converted provisionally 
into a push boat, and after successfully pushing several barges, it was decided to build a true 
push boat. Thus, in October 1930 UHU successfully completed its trials and was put into 
operation between Romania and Germany. Yet despite optimistic predictions, UHU was a 
failure, principally for technical reasons. Its used the Voith-Schneider-Propeller that 
previously was used only for small boats and passenger ships and which proved unsuitable 
for the 700- horsepower UHU.15 Frequent sorties into the shipyard were typical, but at least 
UHU had proven the feasibility of push boats on European waterways.
It was typical for modern technology to be used first in inland navigation on tankers 
This was because the shipping companies were owned by banks or the oil industry. As a 
result, they had better access to capital than other shipowners. But the experience with UHU 
was also characteristic of German bank and petroleum policy. Some of the factors that led 
to UHU and the engagement of Deutsche Bank in the development of new technology were 
the same as, for example, the Baghdad Railway. The bank invested in transportation 
technology solely to increase profits.
Tanker Shipping and National Socialist Economic Policy
One of the main principles of economic policy under National Socialism was autarky. 
Synthetic products based on coal liquefaction were meant to replace imported petroleum. 
Unfortunately, this was not as successful as the government expected, mainly because there 
was little reduction in the outflow of scarce foreign exchange, and few savings compared to 
the investments required. In short, petroleum imports remained necessary. This dilemma 
caused the government to concentrate on petroleum imports from southeastern Europe via 
the Danube. One result was surge in demand for tanker capacity on the Danube. Special 
government aid programmes were designed to remedy this. The 1938 programme, for 
example, called for the construction of ten tanker tow-barges and four motor tankers, while 
the next year's goal was for forty tankers.16 But it was impossible to satisfy the demand once 
World War II began.
While tanker shipping on the Danube increased rapidly, that on the Rhine actually 
fell at the same time. After the war broke out, Rhine tanker shipping nearly ceased. An 
initiative by the petroleum industry, especially the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum-
Gesellschaft, thus started the most unusual shipping operation ever undertaken in tanker 
shipping. Tankers of sixty-seven metres m length, 8.2 metres in width, and about 2.5 metres 
between keel and deck were transported as complete ships by road for more than 300 
kolometres from the Rhine and other rivers, such as the Elbe, to the Danube." A total of 
fifteen tankers, with a total cargo capacity of about 12,000 tons were transported in this 
fashion. Together with some newly-built tankers, it thus became possible to increase German 
crude oil imports considerably. Indeed, the shift of the tankers may have been the most 
important part of economic mobilisation in either the oil industry or inland navigation.
Still, the importance of tanker for the German military was insignificant. Tankers 
were not sufficiently flexible to follow the army or the air force. The navy tried to use inland 
tankers to connect link big petrol depots and naval bases. But the navy's movement into the
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Atlantic and the lack of oil ended these naval-oriented tasks. German tankers could not use 
the waterways to the Atlantic coast because they were too large for the locks and canals, and 
the petrol depots were not used because the petroleum went directly into the tanks of the 
naval vessels. Transportation to the Atlantic ports used French and Belgian tankers, which 
were either chartered or confiscated.18 Except for crude oil imports on the Danube before 
1944, tankers were realtively unimportant in the German war effort.
The Postwar Era
Tanker shipping after World War II differed sharply from the industry before 1939. Only 
Rhine tanker shipping continued in much the same way as before the war. On the Danube, 
tanker shipping was resumed without German companies because of the partition of Europe 
into two economic and political systems. Tanker shipping on the Elbe, the third of the main 
German waterways, was determined largely by the fluctuating relationship between the two 
German states.
After a period of postwar reconstruction, the Rhine tanker fleet earned huge profits 
because of increasing petroleum consumption in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 
The industrial base of the FRG changed from coal to oil from the early 1950s, and through 
the end of the next decade petroleum consumption doubled every five years. This oil had to 
be imported, mainly from North America and the Middle East. Rotterdam became the most 
important port again, with petroleum exports to the FRG of more than 800,000 tons per year 
by the early 1950s. The shipping companies engaged in tanker shipping rebuilt their fleets 
and began to increase the number of vessels. The tankers looked much the same as the 
prewar ships. The only difference was the increasing proportion of motor tankers. Some 
attempts to establish new technologies, such as an ill-fated experiment with aluminium ships 
failed because of high costs.19
A new competitor in petroleum transportation, the pipeline, halted the rapid increase 
of Rhine tanker shipping in the 1960s. At the end of the 1960s every refinery in the FRG was 
connected to a crude oil pipeline. But steady growth in petroleum consumption reduced the 
effects on tankers. Instead of carrying crude oil, the main task of tanker became the transport 
of refined products to consumers. In addition, some overcapacities were reduced with 
specialized programmes to scrap older ships.20 The economics of Rhine tanker shipping were 
in essence a reflection of the economics of the petroleum industry itself.
The history of tank shipping in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was a 
litany of failure. There was no petroleum import harbour along the coast of the GDR, and 
none of the harbours was connected to inland waterways. So there was no tanker shipping 
in this area before the war outside of the shipping routes connected with Hamburg. Between 
1957 and 1960, however, the GDR built a new harbour for overseas trade in Rostock. A 
specialised petroleum harbour was part of the project, which was to be connected to the 
inland system by a new canal between Rostock and the waterways north of Berlin. A fleet 
of twenty-five tankers was planed to operate between the new harbour and the industrial 
regions of the GDR.21 But neither the canal nor the tankers were built. Instead, connections 
to the hinterland were taken over by the railways.
A second attempt to establish tanker shipping in the GDR was initiated in the hope 
of stimulating domestic oil production. In 1969/1970 a test drill in the region of Stralsund 
began. Tankers were envisaged to transport oil to a refinery near Schwedt, a small village
64 The Northern Mariner
on the River Oder. While the drilling tests were ongoing, four dry-cargo ships were 
converted to tankers. But the test wells did not result in production. Because of the lack of 
demand for tanker shipping in the GDR, the new tankers were forced to operate outside its 
borders. After a few years in the FRG, they mainly operated on the Albert Canal in Belgium. 
They thus became part of Western European tanker shipping, albeit under the flag of the 
GDR.22 With this second failure the GDR's interest in tanker shipping ended before it began.
More interesting than tanker shipping in the GDR itself were the tanker operations 
of FRG shipping companies on the Elbe within the territory of the GDR. West Berlin had 
to be provided with oil products, which led to the creation of a special kind of FRG tank 
shipping, the so-called "transit shipping." Although two waterways connected the western 
parts of Germany with Berlin, tankers concentrated on the Elbe. The first postwar years were 
dominated by the Berlin Blockade, and between May 1948 and May 1949 the East Germans 
blocked the Elbe. Thereafter, inland navigation bound for West Berlin was again possible. 
But in 1952 the first tankers joined in transit shipping. This ushered in a kind of "golden 
age" for German inland tanker shipping. The task of supplying Berlin with petroleum was 
its base. Because of a policy to keep oil reserves high, there was no "just in time" business 
but rather long-term contracts for the shipping companies. This also meant that there were 
no seasonal fluctuations. Despite the economic attractions, only a few shipping companies 
entered transit shipping. Special licenses and permits needed to transit the GDR created a 
barrier. But those companies that took the plunge did well, since nearly all of West Berlin's 
energy requirements were met by petroleum. Even the production of municipal gas used 
gasoline as a raw material.23
T a b l e  5
Petroleum Imports into West Berlin by Tankers, 1960-1977
1960 1970 1973 1975 1977
Elbe 397,000 t 1.307,000 t 890,000 t 1,047,000 t 924,000 t
Mittellandkanal 39,000 t 35,000 t 77,000 t 209,000 t 110,000 t
Oder 90,000 t 83,000 t 54,000 t
Total 436,000 t 1,342,000t 1,057,000 t 1,339,000 t 1,088,000 t
Source: E. Hirsch, "Die Tankschiffahrt auf der Elbe nach Berlin," Lauenburger Elbschiffahrtstag 1978 (
Lauenburg, 1978), 279.
In 1972 the two German states began a kind of political rapprochement. A contract 
between the GDR and the FRG allowed the GDR to begin to supply West Berlin. A direct 
consequence was a decrease in transit tanker shipping (see table 5). The golden age had 
ended. But transit shipping remained a good business up to German reunification. For 
example, in 1978 half of all heating oil, sixty-five percent of gasoline and eighty percent of 
heating oil for power stations in West Berlin was supplied by transit tankers. But some 
members of the inland navigation lobby saw the political rapprochement as a direct 
distortion of competition or as a restraint of trade.24 From their perspective this might have 
been correct, but in a more general view the changes in transit tanker shipping must be seen 
as a normalisation of economic relations. In fact, before the rapprochement large subventions 
for shipping companies resulted in a near-monopoly on shipping between Hamburg and 
Berlin.
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Another remarkable development in transit tanker shipping was the design of special 
vessels for this business. The waterways between Hamburg and Berlin stagnated at the level 
of the late 1920s, since the GDR was unwilling to invest in their modernisation.25 In 
consequence, modern FRG tankers could use the waterways only with reduced draughts and 
therefore with smaller cargo capacities. But there was a bright side to this: the width of the 
locks in the GDR was nine metres, rather than the standard 8.2 metres in the FRG. By the 
beginning of the 1960s shipping companies using the Elbe decided to construct tankers with 
optimal dimensions for these conditions (see table 6).
T a b l e  6
Comparison of Elbe Tanker Dimensions, 1960-1961
Ship Year Built Length Width Draught Cargo Capacity
Ludwig Burmester 1960 67.0 m 8.2 m 2.5 m 896 t
(2.0 m) (600 t)
Henri Burmester 1960 67.0 m 9.0 m 2.0 m 809 t
Hans Burmester 1961 67.0 m 9.0 m 2.2 859 t
Source: Elbschiffahrtsarchiv Lauenburg, Konvolut Christoph Burmester.
As long as transit tanker shipping was separated from the other inland navigation of 
the FRG, these ships were very efficient. But after the increase in costs in the 1970s, and 
especially after reunification, these ships caused many problems because they could not 
operate on all the other waterways in the FRG. While they were built with subventions, they 
also required subsidies to be scrapped. In short, transit tanker shipping and shipbuilding 
depended more on political than on economic factors.
From Reunification to 1994
German reunification had some strange effects on tanker shipping. One was obvious: transit 
shipping lost its significance when the military pipelines in Germany were opened for civil transpo
rtation. Another scrapping campaign thus was organised by the EU. Tanker shipping was no 
longer seen only in national but in European terms because more shipping companies from 
other European nations entered the German tanker business. While in the late 1980s only 
one or two tankers were scrapped per year with the help of subventions, thirty-two were 
scrapped in 1990 and sixteen in 1991.26
Tanker operations in the 1990s were marked by stagnation at a level of close to 400 
tankers with half a million tons cargo capacity.27 Since 1994, EU law has clearly changed 
tanker shipping. The Kabotage-Vorbehalt, which provided some protection for German 
inland navigation from international competitors, was declared ultra vires by the European 
Commission. This may lead to more international competition and cause some loss of 
cargoes for German carriers. It may also force a reduction of the significance of petroleum 
for German inland tanker shipping, which has increasingly concentrated on special goods, 
like chemicals or liquefied gas, since the early 1990s. But it is not possible to judge this at 
the moment because the changes are continuing. Therefore, a history of German inland 
tanker shipping has to stop at about 1994.
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Conclusions
German inland tanker shipping depended directly on economic developments in the 
petroleum industry. Sometimes this resulted in great differences in comparison to other 
branches of inland transport. One of the main characteristics of tanker shipping was the 
structure of shipowning. Only a few shipping and petroleum companies owned tankers, 
while many owners of one or two vessels owned the remainder of the inland navigation fleet. 
The shipping and petroleum companies had much better access to capital than other owners, 
and as a result, many technical innovations in inland navigation were first introduced in tank 
shipping. Tanker shipping was never governed purely by economics. As we saw in the 
beginning of tanker shipping on the Danube, or in the discussion of the transit trade, it was 
much more a matter of political interest by the German government and the strategies of the 
petroleum industry.
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